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Introduction. 
This enquiry was undertaken in response to a request 
from the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development for 
an examination of the costs of professional design services. 
Current concern with design costs may he regarded as part 
of a wider concern with the rise in the costs of construction 
as the volume of building activity has expanded in 1966 and 
1967. Estimates of the rise in costs vary widely, but an 
increase of 30% over costs in 1965 might be a modal figure. 
As will be discassed in more detail below, the present 
structure of the scale of fees by which professional designers 
are remunerated is such that a rise in construction costs 
brings an automatic rise in design costs per unit. Anxiety 
by many departments of government lest the financial outlays 
envisaged by the Revised Development Plan yield a less-
than-anticipated physical volume of building has found 
expression in a number of enquiries: that undertaken by the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Building Costs; that of a 
Committee on Professional Pees convened by the Chief Architect 
in the Ministry of Works; and a study of costs and constraints 
in the building industry undertaken b.]^  my colleagues in the 
Institute for Development Studies, University College, 
Nairobi, with which the present study has been associated. 
Why a professional fee? 
The majority of work undertaken by design consultants 
(this term is used throughout to designate architects, 
quantity surveyors, striaetural, electrical, mechanical, 
heating, ventilating, sanitary engineers, landscaping and 
interior designers, etc.) is paid for by a fee expressed 
as a percentage of the value of the work designed. The 
percentage is derived from a scale of fees approved by the 
professional association; in the case of architects and 
quantity surveyors, the fee scales are embodied in schedules 
to the by-laws made under the authority of the Architects 
and Quantity Surveyors Ordinance (Cap 525) 1933? as amended 
1962. The scales specify the minimum fee that may be charged; 
the codes of professional practice of each professional 
association make it an offence to charge less than this 
minimum fee. However, a higher fee may be charged by 
agreement with the client for service beyond the minimum. 
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The effect--of the application of these fee scales is that 
the client cannot discriminate between design consultants 
on the basis of cost; theoretically at least, he cannot 
look for a cut-price service. 
In the eyes of some critics, the fixed fee scale 
amounts to monopolistic price-fixing to the detriment of 
the consuming public. The classic remedy to this evil is 
prohibition, by legal means if necessary, of the restrictive 
price agreement and the institution of competition among 
producers. Thereby the free play of the forces of supply 
and demand will force prices to a presumably lower, "fair" 
level. 
The great majority of design consultants would greet 
this suggestion with horror. Without ignoring the extent 
to which the fixed fee scale serves their collective self-
interest, they would argue that it also serves the public 
interest by buttressing the code of professional practice; 
if individual design consultants were able to compete 
against each other by cutting fees they would be tempted to 
lower the standard of their service to the ultimate detriment 
of the client. Any savings effected in design costs would 
be more than counterbalanced by increases in the costs of 
construction brought about by inferior design or even 
sharp practice. 
The crux of the distinction which the proponents of 
the second line of argument would make between the price 
of an article offered for sale and the fee for a professional 
service is that in the former case, the buyer may reasonably 
be expected to be in a position to evaluate the article 
offered and determine whether he is getting fair value for 
money, while in che second, he is in no position to judge 
the quality of the service offered to him. The point has 
been succinctly put; "The professional is not only the 
judge of what technical solution best fits the client's 
requirements, he is also the technician who supplies that 
solution. The temptation to supply an unnecessarily 
expensive one, or to overcharge, is correspondingly raised, 
and it is therefore necessary for the client to have some 
guarantee of integrity before he can safely venture to 
purchase the professional's services." This guarantee, it 
is argued, can only be supplied by those who are in a position 
to appreciate the quality of professional service, that is 
the fellow members of a profession, which they do by the 
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self-regulation of the profession. In particular, the 
professional association guarantees the competence of its 
members to the public bv admitting to its ranks only 
those who have successfully passed qualifying tests of 
ability, and it guarantees the integrity of its members 
by instituting and enforcing a code of professional practice, 
with the ultimate sanction against the offender of expulsion 
from membership of the professional association. The sanction 
is effective to the extent that the public are unwilling 
to give employment to members of the profession who practice 
without the guarantee of competence and integrity which the 
association gives for its members. The members of the 
profession are willing to submit to this self-regulation 
because it is the means by which the reputation of their 
profession is raised and maintained so that the public are 
willing to give employment to their members; but this 
employment must be for a satisfactory level of remuneration 
to justify the submission to professional self-discipline. 
The fixed fee is therefore justified as the quid pro quo for 
the maintanance of professional standards. 
The close relationship between the public reputation 
of a professional group and the level of employment for its 
mem) ers might be disputed. It might be argued that the 
volume of work available to the design consultants is a 
direct function of the volume of building activity. However, 
it is not necessary for a client to employ a qualified man 
to design his house, office block or factory. ne may do the 
design himself, or he may employ an unqualified designer, 
and so long as the design meets the minimum public health 
standards, it may be constructed. One has only to consider 
the occupational groups whose reputation as a profession is 
insecure, such as psychoanalysts, or astrologers, or even 
quantity surveyors, to appreciate the dispensability of 
professional services. 
The necessary connection between a fixed scale of 
fees and a given standard of professional conduct may still 
be doubted. Comparison with other eminent professions, 
such as the lav/ and medicine, might suggest that a high 
degree of concern with professional standards is perfectly 
compatible with a system of fees graduated with reference 
both to the ability of the practitioner and the means of 
the client; put more crudely, the earnings of doctors and 
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barristers in private practice are determined by supply 
and demand. Neither the surgeon who attends a deserving 
case without fee, nor the successful lawyer who takes a 
brief for the maximum his client can afford, is regarded 
as engaging in unprofessional conduct. 3y analogy, it is 
possible to envisage a situation where professional asso-
ciations of design consultants maintained a stringent control 
of professional practice but no interest in the fees charged 
by their members. On the other hand, doctors and barristers 
are protected from competition by the unqualified bv legal 
limitations on the right to practise (these professions 
have attained the second stage of conroulsory registration, 
see below), which presumably sets a lower limit to the 
degree of fee-cutting which members of the profession are 
prepared to engage in. There is a further distinction 
between the design professions and those with which they are 
here compared. This is that the design consultants are 
engaged inamodified professional/client relationship, one 
which includes a third party, the contractor. The signifi-
cance of the contractor is that his presence offers the 
unscrupulous design consultant the opportunity for colla-
boration at the expense of the client, thereby frustrating 
the intention of the client in appointing the consultant. 
One might argue that a fixed scale of fees is small price 
to pay for protection against this abuse. In my opinion 
the balance of the argument lies in favour of the fired fee 
system, and the mass opposition of the professions to its 
abolition counts as a very practical justification for its 
perpetuation. This, is not the same thing as supporting any 
given scale of fees, and it will be argued below that the 
present percentage scales- are d-pen to numerous objections. 
The. Architects and Quantity Surveyors Ordinance. 
A professional association can provide a greater 
measure of security of employment for its members by securing 
registration of the profession. This requires a legislative 
act setting up a register in which the names of qualified 
members of the profession are recorded. Registration may 
be voluntary, in which case it amounts to no more than 
statutory recognition of a professional association, or it 
may be compulsory. There are two stages of compulsory 
registration; in the first, only registered members may use 
the name of the profession, but unregistered persons may 
practise under other titles while in the second stage only 
registered persons may practise. To date, the only design 
consultants who enjoy the benefits of registration are 
architects and quantity surveyors. 
The East African Institute of Architects unsuccessfully 
promoted a bill to provide for the registration of architects 
and quantity surveyors in 1929• The attempt was repeated 
four years later, with more success. The Attorney-General 
introduced the bill to the Legislative Council, though it 
was made clear that this was not a government measure but a 
private promotion on which a free vote was allowed. The bill 
encountered some very vocal opposition, one Member observing: 
"... this is a Bill to give a monopoly to a small body of 
about 35 to 40 men.promoting the Bill for their own ends 
without a shadow of justification for the public good". The 
bill was referred to a committee, from which it emerged shorn 
of its more objectionable features: a public Board of Regis-
tration was substituted for the East African Institute of 
Architects as the body responsible for effectir^g registration 
and. the proposal that only registered members be allowed to 
practise (i.e. the second stage of compulsory registration) 
was watered down to the stipulation that only registered 
members be allowed to call themselves architects or quantity 
surveyors. In this modified form the bill received a third 
reading and was given the Governor's assent, to come into 
force on the 1st. April 1934*- The Architects and Quantity 
Surveyors Ordinance was amended in 1962, mainly in procedural 
detail. 
The salient features of the present legislation include 
$i) the stipulation that no person may style themselves 
architect or quantity surveyors unless registered, except 
that this provision need not apply to a person employed by . 
the government or contracted to government,0 
(ii) the establishment of a Board of Registration as a body 
corporate capable of suing to protect this right; 
(iii) the Board to consist of 6 members, 3 (of whom one must 
be a quantity surveyor) to be nominated by the East African 
Institute of Architects and approved by the Minister of Viforks 
and 3 to be appointed by the Minister. The Minister is also 
to appoint one of these six members as Chairman, who has a 
casting vote in the event of a tied vote. 
(iv). the Board may make by-laws, subject to confirmation by 
the Minister, for, inter alia, the administration of the 
Board; a definition of unprofessional conduct and for deter-
mining the iao&9 of enquiry into such unprofessional conduct, 
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together with tlis .pemltiea^to. Joexappliett? thai scale.'.of ...fees to 
be charged by architecta-and quantity, surveyors; .ithe soale of fees 
'for registration under the Ordinance; for the holding of 
examinations; "for instructions and orders conducive to the 
maintenance and improvement of the status of architects and 
quantity surveyors in Kenya". 
(v) the Board is to maintain a Register of qualified persons 
(vi) a person may appeal to the Supreme Court against the 
refusal of the Board to register him; 
(vii) the Board may apply to the Supreme Court to have a 
member found guilty of unprofessional conduct struck off the 
Register; ••• 
(viii) engineers, and naval architects, are expressly excluded 
from this legislation. 
By-law 45 deals with the definition of unprofessional 
conduct, and among numerous other provisions states: "... an 
architect or quantity surveyor may be deemed by the Board to 
be guilty of unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct 
if he... • • 
(p) attempt to supplant another architect or quantity surveyor 
or to compete by means of a reduction of fees or by other 
inducement; 
(r) deviate from by charging less than the charges laid down 
in the Fourth Schedule or the Fifth Schedule to these by-laws 
without notifying the Board of his intention to do so and the 
reasons for and the extent of such deviation and receiving 
the Board's sanction thereto; 
(s) undertake or accept instructions for professional work on 
the basis that if a successful result is not attained a * 
reduction of the fee laid down in the Scale of Charges will 
be made, or that no fee will be charged; 
(v) pay another registered person less than the fees set 
forth in the Fourth Schedule or the Fifth Schedule to these 
by-laws. 
With regard to the fixed fee system, two conclusions 
emerge from this analysis of the legal provisions. On the 
one hand, any kind of price-cutting is comprehensively 
outlawed; on the other, the level of the fixed scale of fees 
is potentially subje-ct to public control without resort to 
legislative action. Should the Minister choose to exercise 
his powers, he can secure a complaisant majority on the Board 
which establishes the scale of fees to effect whatever 
revision he feels is in the public interest. Not only does 
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he directly appoint half the members of the Board, including 
the Chairman with his casting vote, but under the By-laws he • 
may withdraw his appointment or approval of -any member of the 
Board at any time, and in any case, all offices automatically 
fall vacant once a year. -Thus it is within the power of the 
Minister to revise the scales as he thinks fit, even over 
the opposition of the representatives of the professional 
associations on the ^oard. Hitherto, the Minister has not 
felt it necessary to exercise these powers, and in practice 
the scale of fees which has been laid down for architects 
has been closely modelled on the' scale employed by the Royal 
Institute of British Architects, and the scale for quantity 
surveyors on that employed by the Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors. 
In this context, it may be observed that the absence of 
a board of registration for other design consultants may make 
it rather more difficult to effect a revision in their scales 
of fees,r should this be thought necessary. 
The scales of fees. 
The scale of fees to be paid to architects is set out 
'in the Fourth Schedule to the By-laws made under the authority 
of the Architects and Quantity Surveyors Ordinance, revised 
in 1963. Section A deals with the architect's code of conduct, 
and emphasises that his sole remuneration is to be from the 
client. Section B states that... "Apart from the two copies 
of the drawings and documents provided for in clause Bl, and 
the drawings specified in A6, the fees as set out in this 
Scale of Charges are in all cases exclusive of the cost of 
all prints and other reproductions of drawings and documents, 
travelling and hotel expenses', and other reasonable disburse-
ments".. "The charge is to be percentage on the total cost of 
all executed works as follows: 
Total cost of executed works 
Up to £700 
£700-£l600 
£l600-.£2500 .' 
£2500-£3400 
£3400-£4300 
£4300-£5200 
£5200-£6l00 
£6100-£7.0 00 
Over £7000 
percentage fee 
10 
9-g- with minimum of £70 
8* 
8 
7t 
7 
6t 
6 
£152 
£225 
' £289 
' £344 
' £390 
1 £427 
1 £455 
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This scale is applicable to new works, and for this the 
architect is required to take overall responsibility from "tjo f ixiQ/1 
brief/certificate. However, the survey work, quantity 
surveying, and other consultant's work is specifically 
excluded from this scale of charges. .Daring construction 
the architect is.required to give general supervision, but 
if the client ^requires constant superintendence a clerk of 
works should be appointed and paid by the client. 
The above scale may be. varied with respect to works 
of repetition, when the fee may be reduced to one sixth 
for twenty repetitions and up to one third thereafter; in 
the case of works to existing buildings a higher fee is 
chargeable, u~d to twice the fee payable for new works of 
the same cost; and a higher charge may be agreed in writing 
between the client and architect. 
The other possible basis for variation of fees is laid 
down in section A8 of the Fourth Schedule. It says: "The 
employment of consultants shall be at the architect's discre-
tion in agreement with the client, and consultants shall be 
nominated or approved by the architect and appointed and 
paid by the client. Where it is agreed to retain the services 
of consultants the architect's fee may, by prior written 
agreement, be reduced, but in no case shall the reduction 
exceed one third of the cost of the work upon which the 
services of the consultants are retained, provided always 
that the architect's fee on the cost of the whole scheme 
shall not be reduced by more than one sixth." 
The Fifth Schedule to the by-laws lays down the 
conditions of engagement and scale of professional charges 
for quantity surveyors. In Section A it is established that 
the fee is based on the total cost of the works, inclusive 
of those items represented by provisional sums in the bill 
of quantities (which do not involve the quantity surveyor 
in any work); it is also emphasised that making up variation 
accounts is a separate service from the preparation of the 
bill of quantities, for which a separate sharge is made. 
The quantity surveyor's fee is not graduated in any way 
with the cost of the works; it is a flat percentage charge 
varying only with the nature of the work. For taking out 
and preparing bills of quantities, the fee is of the 
the estimated cost of the work; for works of alteration, the 
charge is at least -g-fc greater. These fees are- exclusive of 
the cost of printing the bills of quantities, which are 
charged additionally at cost. For repetitive work, the fee 
of 2-gis charged on the first item, and on each subsequent 
item. It is emphasised that this reduction applies only to 
repetition- of a complete -work; "This arrangement does not 
apply to duplication of portions of the same work, in which 
case the full commission shall be charged on the total cost." 
For making up variation accounts, the fee is 3f° on the cost 
of additions and 1-gfo on the cost of ommissions (with some 
exceptions). For pricing-bills of quantities, or for preparing 
approximate bills of quantities and estimating on this basis, 
the fee is -g-%. The same fee is payable for surveying work 
in progress for the purpose of making out interim certificates. 
All percentage fees in respect of civil engineering work, s.s 
opposed to architectural work, are to be half the above 
specified fees. In general, as with architects, the scale 
fee is not intended to cover the cost of travelling, travelling 
time, or hotel expenses necessitated by work at a distance. 
Structural, electrical and mechanical engineers do not 
enjoy the benefits of legislative support for their fee scales, 
but in practice, as tightly organised professional groups, the 
scale of fees laid down by the professional body is as closely 
binding on its members as in the case of architects and 
auantity surveyors. Like their colleagues, consulting 
engineers in Kenya employ the same scales as their counterparts 
in Britain. Fo.r building works where an architect is engaged, 
the structural engineer is remunerated according to a 
degressive scale as follows: £200 per contract (or a smaller 
sum pro rata if the cost of the works is less than £5S000), 
plus: 
Cost of the Works Fee Additional Fee for rein-
Higher fees are payable for works of alteration: alternatively, 
the engineer may be paid by time at the rate of shs3 per hour 
per £100 of annual salary. In addition, the engineer may 
charge out of pocket expenses, or come to an agreement with 
forced or prestressed 
concrete 
On the first £50,000 
On the next £50,000 
On the next £100,000 
On the remainder 
Ho 
6% 
3% 
3* 
37° 5% 
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the client to cover these fcy means of a lump sum or a higher 
percentage fee. Where the works are of a magnitude or 
complexity to require, in the opinion of the consulting 
engineer, that site supervision be carried out by a suitably 
qualified engineer, a resident engineer may be appointed to 
be paid by the client, or by agreement, the client may appoint 
and pay directly the necessary resident site staff. In the 
calculation of the cost of the works above, only that part 
of the works which is designed, specified or supervised by 
the engineer is taken into account. About 25-30ft of the 
total cost of construction of a large building is work 
designed by the structural engineer. The structural engineer's 
fee would therefore be in the region of 3f° of the total cost 
of the building, depending on the size and the method of 
construction. 
> 
For other engineering services, electrical, mechanical, 
heating and ventilation, etc., the consulting engineer.is 
remunerated on a degressive scale as follows: 
Where the cost of the works is less than £5,000, the fee is 
10% subject to a minimum of £40 and a maximum of £400. 
Services constitute a highly variable percentage of the cost 
of construction, but 20% might be taken as a modal figure 
on large buildings. A client'could therefore expect to pay 
- 2fo of the cost of construction to consulting engineers 
other than the structural engineer, in addition to out of 
pocket expenses; alternatively, he may elect to pay by time, 
on.the same schedule as for structural engineers. 
For small and medium size buildings consulting engineers 
will not necessarily be employed. Ei-t;hex the architect may 
design the structure and services himself, or in the case of 
proprietary installations, e.g. lifts, the suppliers of the 
equipment may be asked to tender on a design-and-supply basis. 
In this case the cost of the design is indistinguishable from 
the cost of installation, and the total of professional fees 
will appear, on the surface, to be smaller. E'or larger 
buildings, the architect is more likely to feel that real 
economies are to be gained by the employment of the specialist 
skills of consulting engineers, and will recommend their 
appointment to the client. 
Cost of the Works Fee 
On the first £20,000 
On the next £30,000 
On the remainder 
7% 
6% 
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It follows from this discussion that it is difficult 
to say what the total of professional fees is in the case of 
a typical "building. In the case of a small building, where 
the architect provides all design services, the combined 
fees of architect and quantity surveyor need be no more than 
8-gfo of the construction cost. In the case of large building, 
where a wide range of consultants is employed to design the 
structure and specialist services, fees may total in excess 
of 13$ of "the cost of construction. The example below assumes 
a building whc-se cost of construction is £200,000, where a 
reinforced concrete frame costs £50,000, and where services 
cost £40,000. 
Profession 
Architect 
Basic Percentage Pee 
6$ 
Quantity Surveyor 2i$ 
Structural 
Engineer 
Mechanical 
Engineer 
Electrical 
Engineer 
"Ventilating 
Engineer 
etc. 
(10$ of £50,000)2^ 
plus £200 
Pee 
£12,000 
i5,000 
£5,200 
of £40,000)1. 6fo £3,200 
Additions 
Out of pocket, 
expense s,prints, 
special work 
Out of pocket 
expenses, 
variation 
accounts 
Out of pocket 
expenses, 
resident engi-
neer 
Out of pocket 
expenses, 
resident 
engineer 
Total professional fees 12.7$ + £25,400 plus addition 
The percentage fee for architects. 
There are three major criticisms Y/hich can be advanced 
against the present system of architects' fees based on a 
percentage of.the building cost. The first of these is that 
the building cost does not necessarily bear at all a close 
relation to the cost of design and supervision. When, as 
over the last eighteen months, building costs rise by say 30$, 
the design professions receive a windfall addition to their . 
fee income of the same amount; conversely, when building costs 
fall, as they did during the building slump of the early 1960s, 
the design professions find their fees pared down. A fee 
structure based on a percentage of building costs has the effect 
of exagerating the cyclical fluctuation in professional incomes, 
for at the same time as the volume of work increases the unit 
- 12 -
cost also increases, while when the volume of design work 
drops off the "unit cost also declines. One might regard the 
desire to escape from this exagerated cyclical effect as 
sufficient incentive on the part of the profession to search 
for a more rational fee structure. 
Implicit in the argument above is the assumption that 
design costs are independent of building costs. This seems 
a reasonable assumption, given that the inputs of the design 
process and the building process are totally different. Only 
to the extent that rises in building costs reflect generally 
inflationary conditions can it be said that there is a connec-
tion with design costs, but building costs notoriously fluctuate 
much more than prices in general. A further implication of 
this situation is that over time, the relative costs of 
building and design may diverge so that a fixed percentage 
fee may no longer accurately reflect the costs of design. To 
make the same point in a different way, it would indeed be 
fortuitous of building costs and design costs stood in the 
same ratio today as they did a third of a century ago. Yet 
the 6% foe for architects (which applies to the great majority 
of building v/orks) has stood "unchanged since the Act of 1933 • 
In short, architects' fees would carry much more convinction 
if they were demonstrably related to the costs of the archi-
tectural process. The second major criticism is that, at any 
one point in time, the fee does not accurately reflect the 
differential in cost of designing different buildings. There 
are two possibilities of variation,here; design costs may be. 
assumed to vary with the type of building, and with the size, 
or cost. Following British practice, the Kenyan fee scale 
makes no distinction between a cathedral at one extreme, and 
a warehouse at the other, yet the design effort involved is 
certainly far greater in the case of the cathedral than in 
the case of a warehouse of comparable building cost. The 
RIBA report, "The Architect and his Office" published in 1962 
examined the possibility of introducing a differential fee 
scale, but found itself unable to recommend one on the 
grounds of doubt "whether a fee scale based on type of 
building would genuinely reflect the Variations in design 
costs that occur". Yet one may still be sceptical: countries 
as far apart as Holland, Germany, Israel and the USA success-
fully operate differential fee scales. The scepticism grows 
when the RIBA report continues: "We think it essential that 
before any major change of this kind...is made, a detailed 
examination should be made of the implications of the proposed 
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change on a wide variety of practices handling different 
combinations of types of work in order to ensure that 
abandonment of the swings and roundabouts principle does 
not place some practices with a particular mixture of work 
in a difficult financial position." One may suspect some 
special pleading for sectional interests when the only change 
recommended is one that leaves all practitioners at least 
as well off, and none worse off than before! The report 
concludes with a plea for more research on design costs, as 
a preliminary to action, but in the opinion of the present 
writer there is already sufficient evidence of the need for 
a variation in fee by type of building, taking into account 
factors such as the complexity of design, the number of 
services incorporated in the design, and the degree of unit 
repetition within the building, which is high in the case of 
hotels, blocks of flats and office buildings, and low in 
churches, theatres, and private residences. If the profession 
in Kenya is unable to agree on a classification of building 
types, they might do worse than to adopt one of the classi-
fications already in use. That below was prepared for the 
American Institute of Architects. 
Type A includes buildings of a utilitarian character, such as 
low-cost factories, warehouses and housing. 
Type B includes all buildings not included in other types. 
Type C includes public buildings, schools (except public 
elementary schools) hospitals, banks, theatres, 
libraries and buildings of a similar character. 
Type D includes buildings of exceptional artistic importance, 
such as memorials and fine residences. 
The basic scale for each type is 5,6,7? and 97° respectively, 
though the scale also incorporates a degressive element. 
The second type of variation, by size or cost of the 
building, is already admitted to some extent in the Kenyan 
fee scale. The scale is degressive, that is, as the cost of 
the building increases, the percentage fee declines. However, 
the degressive element is very restricted, to works up to 
£7,000 in value, and thereafter the fee is a flat 6$. It 
seems to be pretty generally accepted that this is wholly 
unrealistic, and that, if a fee of this type is to be retained 
at all, the degressive scale should be comprehensively revised. 
The scale needs to be made degressive to a much higher figure 
for value of the building, to allow the fee to reflect the 
economies of scale that exist in the design of large works. 
It also should more accurately reflect the cost of designing 
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small works. The RIBA report referred to above produced 
considerable evidence that small jobs were unprofitable at 
the present fees, and architects in Kenya allege that they 
do no more than cover their costs on jobs up to £20,000 
in building cost. It would appear that there is general 
support for a revision which raises the fee on small jobs 
and lowers it on large ones. 
The present scale is not without its minor anomalies. 
Because the percentage fee changes with the total cost of 
the work, the fee scale is not smoothly degressive, and it 
becomes necessary to specify certain minimum fees for each 
percentage bracket to preserve the principle that the total 
fee should rise with the cost of the works. An example 
might make this point clearer: suppose there are two plans, 
one for a building costing £6,999 and one for a building 
costing £7,001. of £6,999 is £455, while 6% of £7,001 
is £420. In order to avoid this anomaly, the scale specifies 
that at the 6% rate there shall be a minimum fee of £455, but 
it thereby creates a second anomaly, that the design cost of 
a building worth £7,600 is no greater than the design cost 
of a building worth £7,000. 
All of these difficulties could be overcome at one 
swoop by adopting a scale in which the dogreesive element 
operates not on the total cost, but on the increment in cost. 
This type of scale is employed by structural, electrical and 
mechanical engineers, so that there can be no argument that 
the principle of the scale is not already understood, at 
least by large clients of the building industry. For illus-
trative purposes, an example of the type of scale that might 
be adopted is given below. 
The fee shall be on the basis of the cost of the works, 
in accordance with the following tables-
COST.OF THE WORKS BEE 
On the first £2,000 10% 
On the next £3,000 8% 
On the next £5,000 6% 
On the next £40,000 5% 
On the. next £50,000 
On the remainder 4.% 
The effect of this scale, as compared with the present 
scale, is suggested in the table below. 
NEW SCALE OLD SCALE 
COST OP WOBKS ^(calculated on PEE * PEE total cost) 
£5,000 8.8 £440 7.5 £375 
£10,000 7.4 £740 6.0 £600 
£15,000 6.6 £990 6.0 £900 
£20,000 6.2 £1,240 6.0 £1,200 
£25,000 5.95 £1,490 6.0 £1,500 
£50,000 5.48 £2,740 6.0 £3,000 
£100,000 4.99 £4,990 6.0 £6,000 
£500,000 4,20 :£20,990 6.0 . £30,000 
£1,000,000 4.10 £40,990 6.0 £60,000 
Up to a value of £24,000, the illustrative scale gives a 
higher fee than the present scale; above that figure, the 
illustrative scale gives a lower fee, and on really large 
works a considerably lower fee. 
The degressive scale can be combined with the variation 
by type of building to produce a fee structure which is 
sensitive to variations in design cost. One method of 
combination would be to give each type a weight by which to 
multiply the scale fee, as in the example: 
Type A 0.8 
Type B - 1.0 
Type C 1.1 
Type D 1.25 
A warehouse costing £15,000 to build merits a design fee of 
£990 x 0.8 = £792. An ambassadorial residence costing the 
same amount merits a design fee of £8,990 x 1.0 (assuming 
it falls in type B) = £8,990. A hospital falling in type C 
costing the same amount merits a design fee of £8,990 x 1.1 
= £9,889. (Under the present scale, both would be designed 
for a fee of £12,000). 
N.B. 'The weights and the degressive scale employed here and 
elsewhere in this paper are intended to illustrate the principle 
orily; they should not be read as specific recommendations. 
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A further quantitative factor that calls for attention 
is the amount of reduction in fee that is given for repetition. 
Repetition can be of two kinds: repetition of a unit within 
one building, such as a hotel room, a classroom, a floor in 
an office block; or repetition of a separate building, such 
as one house on an estate. It is suggested that the first 
kind of repetition coiild be appropriately dealt with by 
making the-degree of repetition one'factor In deciding which fee 
category a'given type of building belonged to; other things 
being equal, buildings incorporating a large amount of repe-
tition, such as hotels, should go in a lower weighted category 
than buildings lacking repetition, Such as libraries. The 
second type of repetition receives some recognition in the' 
present fee scale, but one may question whether the reduction 
in fee corresponds at all closely with the reduction In work 
involved with extensively repeated buildings. For example, 
the fee for a design to be repeated 100 times is 70 times the 
unit fee; this seems wholly excessive. 
The architect's fee divides up into two parts, two-
thirds for the design, and one-third for the supervision 
of construction. Regarding the design, the point can fairly 
be made that a design to be repeated 100 times calls for 
greater attention to matters of layout, external appearance, 
and above all, cost planning, than a design for a single house. 
But it is hard to believe that the design effort increases 
anywhere near pro rata with the number of repetitions. This 
extra effort might well be adequately compensated by an 
additional 10% of the unit fee for each repetition. Regarding 
the supervision part, a similar point can be made, that the 
cost does not increase pro rata with the number of repetitions. 
Once the architect has solved a problem that has arisen, 
decided on an adjustment, and instructed the contractor with 
reference to one house, the decision does not heed to be cade 
independently for each additional house. The contractor learns 
what the architect requires as a given process is repeated, 
and therefore needs progressively less supervision. These 
gains may be offset to some extent if the architect becomes 
embroiled in the contractor's managerial problems, which are 
likely to grow in complexity with increasing scale of the 
project, though these problems are not strictly his concern. 
Taking these factors together, there would appear to be room 
for a degree of degression in that part of the fee paid for 
supervision. 
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This amounts to a strong case"for a separate scale of 
fees for extensively repeated designs. The scale might 
operate on some such "basis as this: a separate calculation 
of the design fee and the supervision fee; the design element 
to be calculated on the basis mentioned above; the supervision 
element as one third of the fee for a single work of the 
same cost as the whole project, this fee being derived from 
a degressive scale. In the example below, it is assumed that 
the normal fee structure incorporates the degressive scale 
illustrated on page 14 and the variation by type of building 
given on page 15. 
Example. A housing estate of 100-separate identical 
houses costing £2,00 each to construct. The total fee 
would be made up as follows: 
1. Design element: unit cost (£2,000 x § x 10% x 0.8) 
£ 1 0 6 . 6 
99 repetitions @ 10% £1,056 
£1,162 
2. Supervision element: (£200,000 x -§- x 4.495%) 
£2,996 
Total £4,158 
Under the present scale, the fee for this undertaking 
would be £12,600. If one were to assume the present 
basic scale, but calculate the fee for repetition 
according to the method above, the fee would be £5,308. 
In the preceeding survey, it has been shown that certain 
kinds of design work are over-charged by the present fee scale, 
while other kinds of work are under-charged. My argument has 
been that the fee structure should be revised in Such a manner 
that the fee should accurately reflect the design cost. My 
argument is based on the fact that the effect of the flat 6% 
fee is to confer a subsidy on clients commissioning relatively 
small, complex and unique designs. I have no objection to 
subsidies which are well conceived and executed, but this 
particular subsidy appears to be both accidental and unfortunate. 
Prominent in the first group of clients are private house-owners, 
social clubs, and proprietors of places of entertainment; promi-
nent among the second group are industrial firms, hotel owners 
(hotels should be thought of as the "plant" of the tourist 
industry) and the municipalities which provide low-cost housing. 
A subsidy paid by industrial users and low-income earners to 
high income, earners and pleasure-seekers hardly appears to 
accord with the public interest. 
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One group of clients who would he adversely affected 
hy the introduction of a more rational fee scale are the 
owners and occupiers of private housing. (Public housing 
would not be affected in the sane way, partly because much 
of it is designed by salaried architects anyway, and partly 
because a greater reduction for repetition would affect costs 
favourable). If it is thought desirable that this group 
should be able to obtain professional design services cheaply, 
advantage might be taken of a scheme proposed by the East 
African Institute of Architects. The essentials of this 
scheme are that a pool of designs would be contributed by 
members of the Institute, from which a copy of the plans 
would be made available to the public for a set low charge, 
say £25. This fee would cover the design only. Details of 
the" scheme remain to be worked out, such as who would be 
retained for the supervision of construction, and at what fee; 
What additional charge would be made for necessary alterations, 
e.g. to drainage layouts; and whether quantity surveyors 
could contribute their services on a similar basis. 'The 
existence of such a scheme would offer clients of modest 
means a choice between an "off-the-peg" design at low cost, 
or a "tailor-made" service at the normal fee. 
Architects are not unaware of the anomalies in the 
.present fee structure, but they are not directly affected 
by the inequities. Their attitude is fairly summed up in 
the expression, what they lose on the swings, they gain 
on the roundabouts. They also advance as a merit of the 
present fee structure that its very simplicity is attractive 
to clients. My own experience of interviewing some major 
clients of the building industry tends to an opposite con-
clusion, that the client is prepared to tolerate complexity 
so long as he is assured that he is getting fair value for 
his fee; many clients at present lack this assurance. 
The architect's fee and construction costs. 
The third major criticism that can be advanced against 
the present percentage fee is that it gives the architect 
no incentive to design a cheap building. The RIBA report 
itself refers to "the illogicality of the present system 
under which, by relating the design fee primarily to the 
cost of the building, the architect has a positive disincentive 
to put in more work in order to fulfil the client's requirements 
at the lowest possible construction cost, since by doing so 
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he is both reducing hes fee and increasing his office costs." 
This is a serious criticism to make of a professional fee, 
given that one of the features of professionalism is that 
the expert is expected to protect the client's interest; 
this fee structure gives the professional an interest 
diametrically opposite to that of his client. 
It is one thing.to state the problem; it is another to 
find a solution. One possible approach might be to base the 
fee on the physical size of the building, with suitable 
weighting for variations in size and complexity. One line 
of objection to this proposal is that it gives the architect 
the same theoretical incentive to be lavish with space that he 
now has to be lavish with cost. Against this, the client 
might be regarded as better able to control the size of his 
building than to control the cost. Another line of objection 
is the difficulty of appropriately graduating the fee for 
variations in size and complexity; this is a greater problem 
than in the case of a fee derived from the construction cost, 
because this cost to some extent already reflects these factors 
A fee based on physical size would therefore call for wider 
differentials than a fee based on cost, and the establishment 
of these differentials might be correspondingly more contentious, 
especially in the absence of any precedent. 
An alternative might be to add to a fee based on cons-
truction cost, suitably graduated according to amount and type 
of building, a bonus element rewarding the architect for any 
reduction of the realised construction cost below the national, 
or target, cost for a certain type of building. A possible 
formula for such a fee might be: 
Fee = pwcx + l/5x(n - c), where p = the variable percen-
tage 
w = the weighting by type 
of building 
c = the realised construc-
tion cost per Square 
foot 
n = the notional cost per 
square foot 
and x = the area in square 
feet. 
Example. A -warehouse of 40,000 square feet, where 
w = 0.8, c = 38/- per sq.ft., n = 40/- per sq. ft., and 
p = 5.33%. Inserting these figures into the formula, 
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the fee totals £4,032, made up of a hasic fee of 
£3,232 and a bonus of £800, The building cost 
would be £76,000. Under the present fee scale, the 
architect would receive £4,800, ana the building cost, 
•assuming that without an incentive the architect 
produced/design of average cost, £80,000. 
Example 2. A hospital, 100,000 sq. ft., w = 1.1, 
c = '95/- per sq. ft. n = 100/- per sq. ft. and p = 
4.21/o. The fee would be £26,989 made up of a basic 
fee of £21,989 and a bonus of £5,000. The building 
cost would be £475,000. Under the present scale, the 
building cost would be £500,000 (assuming a design of 
average cost) and the architect's fee £30,000. 
Attractive though the prospect of such cost savings is, 
the practical difficulties of arriving at appropriate notional 
costs are immense, and there is the paradoxical risk to the 
client that savings in capital cost might be made that will 
involve him in higher maintenance costs over the years. 
V/hether related directly or inversely to the construction 
cost, a fee scale that gives the architect a monetary incentive 
to design in a way potentially at variance with the client's 
interests is objectionable. Unfortunately, there appears to 
be no generally available alternative. The salaried architect 
is not exposed to the same incentives, but few clients outside 
the public sector are large enough and build sufficiently 
regularly to employ their own architectural staff. 
Are professional fees too high? 
It is difficult to decide whether the general level of 
professional fees, as opposed to details of the fee scales, is 
"too high". To state the problem immediately invites the 
question, too high in relation to what? There are a number 
of comparisons that might be made, with fee scales in other 
countries, with fee earnings in the past, and with the costs 
of the design process. A fourth comparison has been suggested, 
between the earnings of members of the design professions 
and the earnings of other professionals. Quite apart from the 
practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary information, 
this approach does not attract me. In the first place, it is 
the fee scale, and not the incomes, with which I am directly 
concerned, and there is only an indirect connection between 
the two; in the second place, even if one were to discover 
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that the average earnings of architects in private practice 
were above those of teachers and -university lecturers, and 
below'those- of doctors and dentists, while those of consulting 
engineers were on a par with those of conpany lawyers, I 
know of no universeilly-accepted criteria by which to establish 
that these differentials are right or wrong. Even if one 
were to discover that professional earnings in general were 
above those of design consultants, this would be no evidence 
that the fee scale should be raised to allow higher salaries 
and profits to be paid, nor would it necessarily argue against 
a downward revision of the fee scale. 
The international comparison turned out to be less 
fruitful than anticipated. One problem is that professional 
practice is not by any means uniform as between different 
countries. Eor example, Italian architects, who are paid a 
lower fee than Kenyan architects, do less work for it, in that 
they do not provide detailed drawings, but only general guidance 
for the contractor, in effect leaving detailed design decisions 
to him. The contractor therefore has more work to do, and 
charges accordingly. Kenyan design consultants allege that 
they give more service than their English counterparts, who 
are paid according to the same scale, because they have -to 
contend with greater inexperience on the part of the contrac-
tors; for example, in structural steelwork, it is the practice 
to give detailed drawings of the steel-erectors. On the other 
hand, experienced clients of the industry and professionals 
with a non-British experience frequently allege that the 
standard of work performed in Kenya is lower than elsewhere in 
the world. I am in no position to arbitrate among these alle-
gations, but the point does seem clear that practice differs 
sufficiently to make international comparisons somewhat 
hazardous. 
Still more is this true when it is considered that, 
outside the British sphere of influence, the function of the 
quantity surveyor is not undertaken by a separate professional 
group. Elsewhere the work is variously doen by the architect 
and/or the contractor. The quantity surveying profession 
observe, with justice in my view, that the client loses when 
their work is performed by the contractor, for each contractor, 
who intends to put in a tender has to do much the same work 
in order to prepare his bid. Since he can expect to win only 
a fraction of the contracts for which he tenders, he must 
cover the cost of preparing abortive tenders on the contracts 
he does win. The contractor's price on any given contract 
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under this system therefore includes the cost of the 
professional work on this tender and on several others. 
Where this system is in operation, the total of professional 
fees will appear to he lower than in countries in the 
British sphere of influence, but.the .total costs to the 
client, taking professional fees and construction costs 
together, may well be larger. 
The third difficulty that confronts international 
comparison is that most overseas countries have fee scales 
differently structured from that in Kenya, that is they 
generally incorporate variation by type of building and a 
well-graduated degressive scale. The flat fee whieh 
applies to most architectural work in Kenya therefore compares 
well with certain points on overseas scales and badly at 
others, but it is difficult to make an overall comparison. 
These difficulties need not be insuperable in a more measured 
inquiry, provided that sufficient technical expertise were 
made available. 
The second comparison that might be made is one over 
time. It has already been observed that design consultants 
.have received a windfall rise in their fee incomes of something 
like 30$ over the last couple of years as a result of the rise 
in construction costs, which it may be assumed are only very 
indirectly related to their own costs. If the fee-scale- was 
at the "right" level in the beginning of 1965, there is a 
prima facie case for saying that it is "too high" now. However, 
until 1965 the whole building industry was -in rather a 
depressed state, and it might be argued that only now have 
conditions of "normal" prosperity been attained; or, if it is 
accepted that the industry is now esperiencing boom conditions, 
it might be contended that high earnings in such periods are 
necessary to recoup the losses of lean periods and lay in 
reserves against future slumps. Vvhile the present prosperity 
might not be regarded as conclusive evidence of the need for 
a downward revision of the general level of fees, it might be 
taken as a good opportunity to re-structure the fee scales, 
since any firms which find themselves badly affected have a 
certain margin within which to make the necessary readjustments. 
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Direct evidence on the costs of professional services 
in Kenya would not be available without undertaking for each 
professional group an enquiry such as that of the RIBA 
mentioned above; but indirect evidence about the relative 
level of fees and costs might be found in the extent to which 
design consultants are willing to take advantage of the 
flexibility in their fee scales to offer service to their 
cfents below the conventional price„ In the nature of the 
case, there is very.little evidence available of practices 
which are downright illegal or unprofessional, although many 
allegations of fee-cutting are made, and I found in my inter-
views with clients that one would expect to get a large 
factory building designed for a 4 f e e , and another was 
paying a fee l-g-% lower than his architect stated was the 
charge for the service0 But there are a number of ways in 
which the spirit of the fee scale, if not the strict letter, 
may be evaded: a reduction may be given for the use of other 
•consultants; more service, including the work of other 
professions, may be undertaken for a set fee, and out-of-pocket 
expenses may not be charged. The presumption would be that 
if some consultants can afford to take work on these terms, 
their costs are well below the established scales of fees. 
Again, I have no evidence relating specifically to Kenya on 
this point, but the RIBA report dealt specifically with this 
subject in Britain (where the same fee scales apply) and 
found that around one-third of architects in their sample did 
not charge for travelling or prints, as they were entitled 
\ to do, and three-quarters did not charge for telephone calls 
or postage; three-quarters gave the full scale reduction when 
another consultant was employed, although this concession is 
discretionary; and on works to existing buildings, more than 
half the architects charged a fee of 10% or less,, although 
the fee scale allows fees ranging up to 12-20% to be charged, 
depending on the size of the job* If similar percantages for 
these practices were to obtain in Kenya, I would regard this 
as evidence that the scale fees are high in relation to costs; 
unfortunately, this information is not readily available. 
The conclusion of this section must be that there is no 
firm evidence, as opposed to nagging suspicion, that the 
general level of the present fee scales is excessive, although 
one might well take exception to the structure of some of the 
scales. 
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Implications for Public Policy. 
Given the fact that there is as yet insufficient 
evidence to support a wholesale reduction in the present 
scales of professional charges, are there alternative means 
by which the cost of design services may be reduced, especially 
to public sector clients? One alternative which clients who 
employ some professional staff of their own might find 
profitable is to pay private practioners by time, rather 
than a percentage of the construction cost. The formula 
employed by consulting engineers might equally be used by 
other professions for this purpose. Clients would have a 
reasonable safeguard against abuse of this open-ended commit-
ment in that their professional staff would know what was a 
reasonable amount of time to expend on any project. Public 
authorities in Sweden have employed private practitioners 
on this basis to advantage. It is particularly- -suited to 
large works or works of repetition. This is not a method of 
remuneration which can be recommended for most private clients, 
who have no means of knowing how much work goes into a design. 
It is a short step from employing a firm of private 
practitioners on a time basis to directly employing a salaried 
professional staff. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
prooeed with a comparison of the costs of design work under-
taken in public offices with work put out by those public 
authorities to private firms. Had such an investigation 
been carried out, it might now be possible to recommend with 
assurance that a greater (or lesser) volume of work be under-
taken in public authority offices, and the appropriate number 
of staff engaged. As a by-produet, if it could be shown that 
work put out to private firms cost a great deal more than 
work undertaken by salaried staff, this would be suggestive 
that the fee scales are high in relation to costs. I would 
strongly recommend that this investigation be undertaken. 
There are certain difficulties to be overcome: the nature of 
the work put out and kept in public offices tends to differ; 
the simpler and more repetitive work being performed within 
the public office, and care needs to be taken that all over-
head costs of public offices are taken into account. These 
difficulties are by no means insuperable, and valuable results 
may be expected. Such an investigation would have to take 
into account the effect on costs of higher salaries than now 
prevail, for it is apparent that public offices could only 
undertake more work with larger staffs than they now employ, 
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and this probably entails higher salary scales and/or a 
more vigorous recruitment policy. (This might also be an 
appropriate field for expanded technical assistance from 
overseas). 
A third possibility worthy of consideration is the 
institution of separate fee scales for work performed by 
private firms for public sector clients, as was the case 
until 1960 with local authority housing in Britain. The 
difficulty anticipated here is that at a time when design 
.consultants are fully engaged, they may be unwilling to take 
public work, or put adequate effort into it for a lower fee 
than they can get from other clients. 
. A fourth suggestion is that public sector clients should 
economise on the use of scarce real resources in the shape 
of professional skills by making greater repetitive use of 
existing proven designs. Certain prejudices against uni-
formity on the part of client departments can be anticipated, 
but it is highly unlikely that the critics appreciate the 
high cost of diversity. Although some design costs will be 
saved in this way, the main saving should be in the cost of 
construction, since standardised design can be expected to 
facilitate standardised components and construction methods, 
making possible economies in construction. 
Design and building consortia. 
Hitherto in this paper the focus of concern has been 
the cost of providing professional design services within 
the context of the traditional pattern of relationships of 
the building industry. In this pattern, each design consultant 
works in a firm of his fellow-professionals, distinct from 
his colleagues in other professions and from the contractors 
who execute his designs. In 1966 the Tavistock Institute 
in london issued a report entitled "Interdependence and 
Uncertainty. A Study of the Building Industry" which pins 
on this fragmentation and the'system of communications it 
engenders the responsibility for much of the inefficiency 
of the building industry. Briefly, the thesis of the report 
is that the building process requires that a large number of 
decisions be made by formally independent participants in the 
process; each of these decisions has implications for other 
participants, and should ideally be made on the basis of 
knowledge which they can supply, but in practice the restricted 
/ 
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flow of communication (particularly the fact that there is 
a one-way flow of information only) means that each partici-
pant takes decisions with inadequate knowledge, i.e. uncertain-
ty. The authors of the report therefore look to a more 
effective pattern of communication among She participants 
in the building process to bring greater efficiency to the 
industry. If this conclusion is valid, it carries the 
implication that it is to a reconstruction of working 
relationships, rather than a reduction of fees for present 
services, that we should look for a contribution from the 
design professions which will help to reduce building costs. 
If the professional work can also be done more cheaply with 
a different pattern of communication, this is an incidental 
advantage but not the main one which can be expected. In 
general, it would seem to be a mistake to adopt a penny-
pinching attitude to design costs when there is ample evidence 
(see Elizabeth Layton, "Building by Local Authorities" 
especially Chapters 8 and 9) that investment in design pays 
off heavily in reduced construction costs. 
Two departures from the traditional pattern of relation-
ships in the building industry seem worthy of consideration. 
The first of these is the design consortium, which gathers 
into one firm all the design consultants required on a 
project. Among the advantages claimed for the design 
consortium are: a unified responsibility to the client for 
design and supervision; a more effective co-ordination of 
design decisions as a result of the more open communications 
within a single firm; certain economies in overhead costs. 
The first and second advantages imply a more effective design; 
the second and third a cheaper design. I have no direct 
information bearing on the cost advantage enjoyed by consortia 
over independent consultants in Kenya, but information from 
the United Kingdom suggests that this advantage is substantial. 
(This international comparison appears to me to be perfectly 
valid, given the close similarity of fee scales and professional 
practice in the two countries). The RIBA report, "The 
Architect and his office" dealth with the fees charged by 
consortia in Appendix K, section k, which I quote. 
"K. 24 The visited offices were asked whether they had 
established a consortium with other offices of consultants or 
quantity surveyors. Only five answered 'yes'. 
K. 25 These five offices were asked whether an all-in fee 
had been charged, and if so how it had been divided between 
the professional parties. The answers given were various. 
A representative selection covering different offices and 
jobs is tabulated below 2-
Job Number 1 2 3 4 5 
Architect 4.5% 3. 6% 5% 4% 5% 
Quantity Surveyor Extra 2. 5% 2% 3% 2.5% 
Structural Engineer ) 
Mechanical Engineer j 
Electrical Engineer ) 
2. 4% ) 
0% j 
0% ) 
2% 2.5% 
4% 1. 
1. 
3% ) ) 1% 
) ) ) Extra 
T0TA1 FEES 8.5% +10.5% 10% 10% 10% + 
K. 26 The general practice appeared to be that the fee was 
agreed for each job between the professionals concerned and 
then with the client. The client then paid the total fee 
by instanments to the architect who distributed the agreed 
share to each member of the team. 
K. 27 The all-in fee was generally around 10 per cent. This 
compares with the 13 per cent or so which the client would 
pay if all the members of the consortium charged their full 
fees separately." 
If one assumes that the difference in fee is an accurate 
reflection of the difference in costs incurred by the design 
team working in a consortium as opposed to independent firms, 
there is a strong case for encouraging the development of 
design consortia. At the present moment, those design 
consortia which exist in Kenya are unable to pass their 
(presumed) cost advantage on to the consumer, by the require-
ment that they charge a fee equivalent to the total of the 
fees payable to independent consultants. This appears to me 
to be an indefensible piece of restrictive practice, which 
has the dual effect of raising the cost of the service to 
the public and retarding an intrinsically desirable development 
in professional organisation. The argument for a fixed fee 
is that it is a defence for an adequate quality of service, 
but the ability of the consortium to offer a lower price 
stems from organisational economies and not from any threat 
to quality (an improvement in quality is claimed). I would 
therefore recommend that design consortia be allowed to 
quote all-in fees less than the sum of independent consultants' 
fees by a margin which accurately reflects their cost 
advantage (on British evidence, about 20%). 
The second development is the package deal offered by -
the building firm which employs its own professional designers; 
such'a firm is able to offer the client a complete building 
service. The advantages claimed for the package deal include: 
a unified responsibility to the client for all stages of the 
building process; integration of design and construction 
decision with consequent economies in time and money; economies 
resulting from' system'building. ' In the package d e a l i t 'is 
not' possi-ble te-disentangle the design and .construction costs. 
The disadvantage's of the package deal are said to- include: the 
disappearance of the independent design consultant as guardian 
of the client's interest vis-a-vis the contractor; the diffi-
culty of knowing'whether the quoted price is fair, because. 
there is' no" open tender for the' construction phase, and ' :l vj.--
different packages are of non-comparable designs; the vested 
interest of the builder in offering one rather than the 
optimum technical solution to the user's needs. It is also 
alleged that it is difficult to get firms offering a package 
deal to commit themselves to a firm price„ None of these 
disadvantages appears overwhelming to a client such as a large 
public authority employing its own technical staff in a 
position to safeguard the consumer interest; however, there 
are obvious dangers for smaller clients. 
One compromise solution which offers certain safeguards 
for .the client, which falls somewhere between the professional 
consortium and the complete package deal is the negotiated 
contract, where a nominated contractor joins the design 
consortium at the earliest design stage. His knowledge of 
methods of construction and possible cost savings is thereby 
made abailable to the design team; for his part, he has 
advanced notice of requirements of labour, materials and 
equipment. When the design is completed, the contractor offers 
a price for the work. If his price is considered satisfactory 
by the design team, they can recommend that the client accept 
it; if they feel the price is too high, they can put the work 
out to tender in.the normal way and pay the contractor a fee 
for his contribution to the design. This is the method which 
has been highly successful in Dutch housing projects. This 
again appears to be a method with which the large public client 
might experiment in an effort to reduce the total cost of 
construction, rather than specifically the cost of the design 
service. 
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Conclusion and recommendations. 
The restricted scope of this enquiry and the limited 
technical knowledge of its author inevitable make this report 
a fragile basis for action. It is clear that there is scope 
for further enquiry into (i) the comparative costs of design 
work performed in public offices and work put out to private 
firms; (ii) international comparisons of fee scales and 
classification of types of buildings (iii) the advantages 
and disadvantages of using the design professions in non-
traditional relationships. At the same time there appears 
to be a prima facie ca.se for action to re-structure the 
existing fee scales of the design professions in the following 
ways: 
(i) the fee scale for architects should be modified to allow 
a higher fee on'works of lower value and a lower fee on works 
of higher value; 
(ii) the degressive percentage should apply to the incremental 
C'O'St "and""not"to" the total cost; 
(iii) the fee should be varied by type of building;. 
(iv) there should be a substantially higher reduction in fee 
for works or repetition than at present; 
(v) the fees for engineers should explicitly incorporate a 
reduction in fee for works of repetition; 
(vi) design consortia should be able to charge a fee lower 
than the sum of the fees to be paid to independent consultants. 
I would recommend that the Ministry of Works draw up 
proposals on these lines to be submitted for detailed discu-
ssion with representatives of the professions; the existing 
departmental committee on professional fees offers a suitable 
forum for such discussion. 
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